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I. Introduction
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
held its 2010 International Conference, entitled “Future of Central Banking under
Globalization,” on May 26 and 27, 2010, at the Bank of Japan Head Ofﬁce in Tokyo.
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The conference sought to shed light on the global linkage between the ﬁnancial mar-
kets, the ﬁnancial system, and the real economy to explore implications for the future
of central banking. The conference involved some 100 distinguished participants from
academia, international organizations, and central banks.
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The conference began with two opening remarks, delivered by the Governor of
the BOJ, Masaaki Shirakawa, and by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Fed), Ben S. Bernanke. The honorary adviser of IMES,
Bennett T. McCallum (Carnegie Mellon University) delivered the keynote speech.
William R. White (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) pre-
sented the Mayekawa Lecture. Each of the ﬁve sessions consisted of a paper pre-
sentation and two formal discussions, followed by ﬂoor discussions. The conference
concluded with a policy panel discussion.
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In his opening remarks,
3 Shirakawa discussed the future of central banks and central
banking. He pointed out that central banks had succeeded in stabilizing inﬂation and
economic activity and now faced new and difﬁcult challenges, such as changes in the
manifestation of economic imbalances, the risk of creating new bubbles through policy
response after the bursting of a bubble, and the risk of involvement in quasi-ﬁscal policy
through unconventional policy measures. In addressing these challenges, he empha-
sized the importance of understanding the primary mandate for a central bank, improv-
ing ﬁnancial structures, and adequately considering the international monetary system.
Finally, he touched on the importance of institutional culture for central banks, encom-
passing banking operations, constant learning, integration of wide-ranging knowledge,
and cooperation among central banks.
Bernanke discussed central bank independence, transparency, and accountability.
4
Referring to theory and experience, he argued that greater central bank independence
contributed to desirable macroeconomic outcomes and ﬁnancial stability. However, he
spoke against unconditional independence, suggesting that the central bank’s actions
must be accountable to the public, its goals set by the government, and its independence
not extended to non-monetary functions without qualiﬁcation. Finally, he called for
clarity regarding the range of central bank activities, addressing the issue of the
ﬁscal/monetary distinction arising from unconventional policy.
From the ﬂoor, Kazuo Ueda (University of Tokyo) asked about the importance
of setting a higher inﬂation target to produce a wider safety margin against the zero
lower bound of nominal interest rates. While Shirakawa in his speech had stated that
a higher inﬂation target did not seem to have materially changed the recovery path
of the economy, Bernanke answered that central banks had established credibility for
inﬂation rates close to 2 percent, and that it would be risky to reset the inﬂation target.
Regarding the inﬂation target, Pierpaolo Benigno (LUISS Guido Carli) inquired about
the need for numerical clariﬁcation of price stability. Bernanke responded that there
were different ways to communicate what price stability meant, pointing out that the
Fed had no ofﬁcial target, but provided information about inﬂation projections in a
long time horizon.
Benigno asked whether central banks’ unconventional policy should be conducted
in normal times. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (University of California at Berkeley)
added a question inquiring whether foreign currency swap programs should be made
permanent. In his reply, Bernanke noted that he valued their backstop role in stabiliz-
ing the ﬁnancial markets under severely stressed circumstances, but believed that such
measures should be temporary, serving as incentives for ﬁnancial institutions to manage
currency mismatches. Shirakawa added that in the face of systemic crisis, the most
important role for central banks became the role of the lender of last resort. Regarding
the foreign currency swap program, both Bernanke and Shirakawa pointed out the
importance of infrastructure elements, including cross-border collateral arrangements.
3. For details, see Shirakawa (2010).
4. For details, see Bernanke (2010).
2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2010Future of Central Banking under Globalization
III. Keynote Speech: The Future of Central Banking: A Lesson
from United States History
5
McCallum reviewed an aspect of U.S. monetary history by discussing how the metal-
lic standard had been overturned by the ﬁat money system, relating the process to the
issue of greenbacks during the Civil War and subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
He argued that the failure of the Supreme Court to distinguish between monetary and
ﬁscal policy had contributed to decisions that made possible the shift from the metallic
standard to a ﬁat money system. He noted that although the U.S. Constitution was
designed to prevent major changes in the purchasing power of the medium of exchange,
due to the absence of readily available data on comprehensive price indices, the metallic
standard had been the only means of achieving price stability. As for the implications
for current monetary policy, he concluded that the availability of comprehensive price
indices made possible a clear monetary standard that would be in accordance with the
Constitution and emphasized the importance of a clear distinction between monetary
and ﬁscal policy aspects of central bank actions.
IV. Mayekawa Lecture: Some Alternative Perspectives
on Macroeconomic Theory and Some Policy Implications
6
White stressed the need to review workhorse models for monetary policy analysis,
such as new classical and New Keynesian models and applied Keynesian models, in
addition to a consideration of insights from the Austrian school. He pointed out three
shortcomings in the workhorse models: new classical and New Keynesian models as-
sumed a self-stabilizing economy; applied Keynesian models performed poorly in fore-
casting turning points and tended to ignore expectations; and all of the models paid
inadequate attention to credit, balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions, and ﬁnancial im-
balances that led to crises and subsequent stagnant economic conditions. In contrast, he
stressed,theAustriantheory consideredthecreationofmoney and creditintheﬁnancial
system. Finally, he suggested that monetary policy needed to have a long-term horizon,
focusing on avoiding future crises arising from the accumulation of imbalances. He
noted that policies directed to lowering the probability and costs of major crises would
be more tolerant of minor downturns than previously.
In the general discussion, Pierre Siklos (Wilfrid Laurier University) pointed to
the difﬁculty of assessing the magnitude and duration of downturns. White replied
that downturns over the preceding 20 years had been relatively limited. Thomas J.
Jordan (Swiss National Bank) asked about policy recommendations during the recent
crisis. White, pointing out the importance of medium-term policy implications, replied
that policy actions taken during the crisis had been appropriate, from the perspectives
of both Hayek and Keynes. Takatoshi Ito (University of Tokyo) and Ueda inquired
about how to formulate monetary policy in a leaning-against-the-wind manner. White
5. For details, see McCallum (2010).
6. For details, see White (2010).
3suggested expanding the Taylor rule to include useful indicators for imbalances, such as
the growth rate of credit and a spectrum of asset prices. However, he suggested ignoring
these terms until deviations from norms reached a certain magnitude.
V. Paper Presentation Sessions
A. Can Cross-Border Financial Markets Create Good Collateral in a Crisis?
7
Makoto Saito (Hitotsubashi University) presented a model in which a country-speciﬁc
catastrophic shock was shared between two countries in the presence of solvency con-
straints. Using the model, he explored whether markets could create collateral assets
(relatively safe bonds) in a crisis endogenously. Due to severe solvency constraints,
realized catastrophic shocks could not be covered fully by ex ante arrangements of ca-
tastrophe insurance. However, most uninsured shocks could be ﬁnanced ex post by the
collateral asset created endogenously. As for the underlying mechanism, he explained, a
non-damaged country ﬁnanced risky loans (Lucas tree) by issuing relatively safe bonds
to a damaged country. Such safe bonds served as high-quality collateral on the damaged
country to ﬁnance uncovered losses without violating solvency constraints.
In his comments, Maurice Obstfeld (University of California at Berkeley) pointed
out the unrealistically small ratio of dividends to labor endowment. He also noted that
the international risk-sharing did not occur not just in catastrophic environments, but in
normal ones. The second discussant, Mark M. Spiegel (Fed San Francisco), pointed
to plummeting consumption in Argentina and insolvency issues in Greece as facts
inconsistent with the model presented. He then indicated that holding the Lucas tree
enabled global risk-sharing and suggested introducing a country-speciﬁc Lucas tree.
From the ﬂoor, Gourinchasasked what would happen if equities were undervalued,
not overvalued. Saito answered that the overvalued case was more realistic. In reply to
Obstfeld, Saito noted that since a sufﬁcient Lucas tree was a good risk-sharing device,
he had set a very low ratio of dividends to labor endowment. To avoid this aspect,
he proposed introducing a Lucas tree-speciﬁc shock or a country-speciﬁc shock. In
response to Spiegel, Saito argued that in some developed countries like Japan, despite
the major ﬁnancial shock and the drop in GDP in 2007–09, consumption was relatively
stable. Finally, he admitted that insolvent cases fell beyond the scope of the model.
B. Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty
8
Gourinchas coined the term “exorbitant duty” to accompany the existing idea of “ex-
orbitant privilege.” Exorbitant duty represented a deterioration in the U.S. net foreign
asset position in times of global stress, while exorbitant privilege represented a higher
return on U.S. external assets than payment for its external liabilities. He estimated
payments from the United States to the rest of the world to be approximately 19 percent
of U.S. GDP during the recent crisis from 2007 to 2009. To explain these observations,
he proposed a model for the center country in the international ﬁnancial system. In this
model, the United States had more risk tolerance than the rest of the world, generating
7. For details, see Saito, Suzuki, and Yamada (2010).
8. For details, see Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010).
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cross-country differentials in consumption patterns. Consequently, the United States
acted as a provider of insurance against global shocks, collecting insurance premiums
in good times while making insurance payments in times of crisis.
The ﬁrst discussant, Kosuke Aoki (London School of Economics), commented that
exorbitant duty was potentially inconsistent with two observations. First, the exchange
rates of two major U.S. bond holders, Japan and China, had appreciated during the
crisis, indicating that these countries had not received transfers from the United States.
Second, in terms of consumption smoothing, the cross-country relationship between
the U.S. bond holdings and consumption during the crisis had been unclear. The second
discussant, Karolina Ekholm (Sveriges Riksbank), pointed out that global imbalances
did not constitute an issue of concern if the exorbitant privilege hypothesis was correct
and called for a deeper quantitative analysis.
From the ﬂoor, Obstfeld suggested incorporating economic growth and sepa-
rating intertemporal substitutions and degree of risk aversion in the utility function.
Gourinchas argued that incorporating economic growth under the current setting of
the utility function generated the non-stationarity, but modifying the utility function
appeared to resolve the problem. In response to Aoki, Gourinchas remarked that the
focus of the paper was on the transfer from the United States to the rest of the world, not
the receipt of a transfer in a speciﬁc country. Ito asked about the role of deleveraging
of the U.S. ﬁnancial institutions during the recent crisis.
C. Banking Globalization and International Business Cycles
9
Kozo Ueda (BOJ) presented a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model to examine the nature of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and its immediate spread
throughout the world due to the banking globalization. In the model, ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries (FIs) entered into chained credit contracts at home and abroad, engaging
in cross-border lending to entrepreneurs by undertaking cross-border borrowing from
investors. The FIs as well as the entrepreneurs in two countries were credit constrained,
so their entire net worth mattered. Using the model, he argued that the FIs’ global-
ization, net worth shock, and credit constraints were the keys to understanding the
recent crisis. Finally, for policy implications, he pointed out that the FIs’ globalization
enhanced the spillover effects of domestic monetary and capital injection policy on the
world economy.
In his comments, Christopher J. Waller (Fed St. Louis) suggested constructing
a ﬂexible price model and studying its behavior before extending it to a sticky price
model. He pointed out that according to U.S. data, corporate retained earnings ex-
ceeded aggregate investment, which was inconsistent with the model’s assumption that
investment had to be ﬁnanced by borrowing. Finally, he cast doubts on the shock sus-
tained by FIs as the driving source of the recent crisis, arguing that the main source of
shocks was the eruption of severe information frictions.
From the ﬂoor, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura (BOJ) asked why a bilateral correlation for
GDP was negative in the 1990s but positive in the 2000s. Ueda answered that the de-
gree of bilateral correlations depended on the sources of the shocks and that the FIs’ net
9. For details, see Ueda (2010).
5worth shock combined with increasing FIs’ globalization in the 2000s yielded the high
bilateral correlation. Responding to Waller, Ueda remarked that his model was based on
asymmetric information, thereby creating endogenous propagation mechanisms arising
from information frictions. At the same time, he admitted difﬁculty in explaining the
very nature of the shock sustained by FIs. Regarding the ﬂexible price model, he re-
ferred to his previous paper.
10 Etsuro Shioji (Hitotsubashi University) inquired about
the method for analyzing the foreign currency swap program using the model.
D. Globalization, Pass-Through, and Inﬂation Dynamic
11
Benigno presented a model in which globalization inﬂuenced inﬂation dynamics
through more intense competition with foreign ﬁrms. In this model, domestic and for-
eign ﬁrms competed strategically to increase market share through pricing decisions.
He showed that the progress of globalization, interpreted as an increase in the presence
of foreign goods in the domestic market, increased the exchange rate pass-through.
Moreover, globalization inﬂuenced inﬂation dynamics by changing the pricing strate-
gies of domestic ﬁrms, modifying the slope and the position of the Phillips curve. He
then presented empirical evidence that increased competition due to newcomers like
China had increased the exchange rate pass-through, as the model would predict.
Shioji,t h eﬁrst discussant, began by introducing the long-standing debate in Japan
about whether relative price changes, caused by an increase in imports of low priced
goods from China, had lowered aggregate prices. In his view, the model provided clues
to an explanation for such phenomena. He suggested incorporating intermediate goods
in the model and strengthening the analysis in the empirics. The second discussant,
Mark Wynne (Fed Dallas), cast doubts on the robustness of empirical evidence for
the increase in exchange rate pass-through. He then remarked that ﬁrms in the model
competed on the basis of price, while internationally active ﬁrms competed on the basis
of innovation.
From the ﬂoor, White emphasized the effect on unit labor costs rather than on
prices. In reply to Shioji and White, Benigno answered that both unit labor costs
and intermediate goods were missing but important components. He agreed that the
empirical evidence was as yet inconclusive. Aoki asked whether a permanent change
in a foreign share in the model changed the degree of pass-through permanently, and
whether the model was applied to Japan to estimate the length and scale of deﬂation.
Benignorepliedthatthepermanentchangeintheforeignsharewouldchangethesteady
state, and that the model made it possible to simulate conditions in Japan using linear
approximations around a non-zero inﬂation steady state. Siklos asked about the effects
of monetary policy on exchange rates and inﬂation dynamics; Obstfeld called for a
general equilibrium model to analyze the effects. Shigenori Shiratsuka (BOJ) pointed
to adjustments in the economic structure due to international competition as another
channel linking relative price changes to general prices.
10. For details, see Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009).
11. For details, see Benigno and Faia (2010).
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E. Financial Regulation Going Forward
12
Franklin Allen (University of Pennsylvania) argued that the recent crisis was primarily
caused by housing price bubbles, and that housing price bubbles were caused by both
easy monetary policy and the easy availability of credit. He then related easy credit
conditions to global imbalances caused by the build-up of large foreign exchange re-
serves at Asian central banks. He suggested three reforms: ﬁrst, ﬁnancial regulations
and government intervention needed to be based on a coherent intellectual framework
for correcting market failures. Second, central banks needed to be subject to more
checks and balances than currently. Third, the international ﬁnancial framework needed
to be reformed so that Asian countries could rely on it in crisis times, thereby reducing
the need for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
The ﬁrst discussant, Ito, argued that regulatory failure was the most important fac-
tor of the three raised by Allen. He noted that although the Japanese experience in the
late 1990s was similar to the recent U.S. experience, one aspect Japan had handled bet-
ter than the United States was to quickly introduce a resolution mechanism for failed
ﬁnancial institutions through the Financial Reconstruction Law of 1998. The second
discussant, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (International Monetary Fund), pointed out that mar-
ket failures led to misaligned incentives and, in turn, to unstable economic systems. She
then proposed three measures of macroprudential response: countercyclical prudential
measures to dampen cyclical swings; structural measures to reduce the probability
and cost of ﬁnancial institutions’ failures; and macroeconomic measures to respond
to ﬁnancial and global imbalances.
From the ﬂoor, Enrique Alberola (Bank of Spain) commented that Spain had not
experienced the recent massive housing bubble or the resulting bursting, but that the
damage on the real side of the economy had been dramatic and the ﬁnancial system
was poorly regulated and supervised. In reply to Alberola and Ito, Allen noted that he
focused on the U.S. case, but that it was important to consider cases in other countries.
Pierre Jaillet (Bank of France) asked about the net economic beneﬁts of ﬁnancial inno-
vations after accounting for the costs generated by ﬁnancial crises. Allen answered that
ﬁnancial innovations had contributed signiﬁcantly to the economy. Wataru Takahashi
(BOJ) pointed to two types of policy responses, ex ante and ex post, and argued that
the latter was important to make use of the market mechanism. With respect to ex post
actions, Hiroshi Nakaso (BOJ) pointed out that liquidation might simply degrade the
asset quality of a failed bank over time, yielding large eventual losses.
VI. Policy Panel Discussion
In the panel discussion chaired by Obstfeld, Nakaso, Jordan, and Mário Mesquita
(Banco Central do Brasil, former Deputy Governor for Economic Policy) stated their
views on the future of central banking under globalization, touching on policy measures
taken in response to the global ﬁnancial crisis.
12. For details, see Allen and Carletti (2010).
7A. Panelist Speeches
Nakaso discussed global capital ﬂows, ﬁnancial infrastructures, and implications for
the future of central banking. First, regarding global capital ﬂows, he presented evi-
dence that developing countries in the recent crisis had withdrawn funds from Euro-
pean banks. Due to maturity and currency mismatches, European banks had faced
severe shortages in their U.S. dollar holdings. Second, with respect to ﬁnancial infra-
structures, he pointed to the need for international coordination, explaining the scheme
of the foreign currency swap program and the cross-border collateral arrangements. He
asserted that these coordinated actions had functioned well in the recent crisis to ensure
ﬁnancial stability. Third, with respect to implications for the future of central banking,
he proposed that central banks needed to assume a macroprudential perspective to
continue improving ﬁnancial infrastructures and to review the wider role in a global
context of central banks as the lender of last resort. He concluded by claiming that
central banks were best positioned to be aware of liquidity conditions in both domestic
and foreign currencies, the solvency conditions of key players in ﬁnancial system in
their jurisdiction, and the microprudential conditions of individual institutions.
Jordan discussed the interactions of monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
He began by pointing out that central banks had concentrated on price stability for
many years, but that the recent crisis revealed a need for both macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial stability. To this end, he called for a new concept to address system-wide
ﬁnancial risks from a macroprudential policy perspective. He asserted two primary
goals for macroprudential policy: to strengthen the resilience of the ﬁnancial system
and to prevent mounting imbalances in credit and/or asset prices. With respect to the
instruments of macroprudential policy, he noted that the ﬁrst goal was achieved mainly
by microprudential instruments, whereas the second posed a much greater challenge.
He pointed to the importance of a deep understanding of the relationship between
microprudential policy, macroprudential policy, and monetary policy. Touching on the
risk of undermining monetary policy independence due to an inseparable link between
politics and prudential policy, he concluded that a realistic step would be to concentrate
on a few instruments to counter pronounced imbalances in credit or asset markets.
Mesquita discussed the future of central banking from the perspective of emerging
economies. He noted that central banks in mature economies tended to focus on price
stability rather than ﬁnancial stability, while central banks in emerging economies often
had prudential responsibilities as well. He then argued that both monetary policy and
prudential policy could play increasingly important roles in handling asset price and
credit booms. He noted, however, that using monetary policy to deal with prudential
risks was not straightforward. For example, in a policy trade-off, asset prices in Brazil
had increased and currency had appreciated after the recent crisis. He then discussed
unconventional policies in Brazil. To mitigate the severe liquidity squeeze, Banco
Central do Brasil (BCB) had eased reserve requirements for private banks under the
condition that they used the proceeds to buy assets from small banks and U.S. dollars
from the BCB. The BCB had also sold part of the previously accumulated foreign
exchange reserves during the crisis. He argued that reserves were useful because for-
eign policy measures like the foreign currency swap program would not necessarily
have been granted for Brazil. Regarding the supervision activities of central banks, he
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emphasized the potential conﬂict between monetary policy goals and prudential policy
goals. He, however, noted that knowledge on the state of the ﬁnancial system, required
for the lender of last resort, could be achieved through involvement in direct super-
vision. He concluded that inﬂation targeting policy would persist, while emphasizing
the need to monitor asset prices and credit conditions based on a consideration of their
implications for ﬁnancial and economic environments.
B. General Discussions
From the international perspective, Takahashi argued that as market integration with
emerging economies gained pace, central banks were increasingly obligated to improve
ﬁnancial infrastructures and coordinate their policies from the practical and operational
aspects, together with emerging economies. In reply, Nakaso pointed to the importance
in policy coordination and ﬁnancial stability of a forum like the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS). Alberola inquired about the consequences of the large-scale supply
of credit by public banks in Brazil. Mesquita answered that the market share of public
banks had increased, but was likely to decline over time due to more aggressive lending
by private banks. In response to a question from Obstfeld regarding the effectiveness
of capital controls during the crisis, Mesquita indicated capital controls had been used
frequently in Brazil to deter capital inﬂows, but had proved less effective than was
hoped for by the authorities.
Regarding the relationship between monetary policy and prudential policy, White
suggested distinguishing between microprudential and macroprudential regulatory
authorities. David Archer (BIS) asked about the risks of impairing central bank in-
dependence through theirgreaterinvolvement inregulatory andmacroprudential policy.
Jaillet pointed to a certain lack of clarity in the deﬁnition of macroprudential policy
and suggested distinguishing macroprudential instruments from monetary policy instru-
ments. In response, Jordan stated that central banks were inevitably active in certain
aspects of macroprudential policy, even in the absence of a clear and unambiguous
deﬁnition and risks of political intervention. Ito commented that the Financial Services
Agency (FSA) in Japan handled microprudential regulation, while the BOJ held ex-
amination powers, and that these two agents worked well together. Nakaso added that
Japan’s FSA handled microprudential policy, while the BOJ handled on-site examina-
tions from a differing perspective as the lender of last resort. He also pointed out that the
Financial Risks Management Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and in which
the Governor of the BOJ participated, played a key role in dealing with systemic risks
by taking various extraordinary measures involving taxpayer money.
Regarding the implementation of macroprudential policy, Charles L. Evans (Fed
Chicago) pointed to a potential new problem for central banks as they sought to achieve
ﬁnancial stability as inelastic risk premiums to risks. He cited the example in which
inﬂation was anchored under an inﬂation targeting policy, leading to inelastic inﬂa-
tion dynamics to economic disturbances. Jordan suggested a need for deeper insights
into unintended consequences when central banks sought to achieve ﬁnancial stability
under conditions of incomplete knowledge. Obstfeld argued for setting predictable
rules to avoid blindsiding market participants. In response to Obstfeld, White observed
that excessive transparency could be counterproductive, as in the case from 2003 to
92007, when the Fed had been explicit about its intentions, in turn encouraging markets
to double up on leverage. Nakaso responded that although transparency was a difﬁ-
cult issue, it was less counterproductive than claimed by White, pointing out the role
played by the transparent foreign currency swap program during the crisis. Mesquita
responded that he supported a measure of constructive ambiguity, illustrating the risk of
creating moral hazards if the corporate sector knew that the government bailed out the
corporatesectorincrisisusingsufﬁcientforeignexchangereserves,leadingtoexcessive
exposure of the corporate sector to foreign exchange risks.
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Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Morning Opening Session
Chairperson: Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, Bank of Japan
Opening Remarks: Masaaki Shirakawa, Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
Keynote Speech: The Future of Central Banking: A Lesson from
United States History
Chairperson: Charles I. Plosser, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia
Keynote Speech: Bennett T. McCallum, Carnegie Mellon University
Session 1: Can Cross-Border Financial Markets Create Good
Collateral in a Crisis?
Chairperson: Charles I. Plosser, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia
Paper Presenter: Makoto Saito, Hitotsubashi University
Discussant: Maurice Obstfeld, University of California at
Berkeley
Discussant: Mark M. Spiegel, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco
Afternoon Mayekawa Lecture: Some Alternative Perspectives on
Macroeconomic Theory and Some Policy Implications
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